Master of roster
What is Master of Roster
Master of Roster or "MoR" is a judicial administrative principle of the Supreme Court of India under which the Chief Justice of India has the exclusive authority to oversee the listing of cases, allocate matters to benches, and constitute benches of the Court. The power is exercised solely by the Chief Justice and is not shared with the collegium or other senior judges. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this prerogative in multiple decisions, holding that the expression “Chief Justice of India” for the purpose of case allocation refers to the individual office-holder and not to a collective body of judges.
Official Definition of Master of Roster
Although the expression “master of roster” is commonly used across common law jurisdictions, it does not appear as a formally defined term in any Indian statute or constitutional provision.
Legal provisions relating to Master of Roster
The basis for the Chief Justice’s authority over case distribution is found in Chapter Six of the Handbook of Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure, 2017 , which outlines the respective functions of the Chief Justice of India and the Registrar in relation to the preparation of the roster. The Registrar is required to frame the roster under the directions of the Chief Justice, who retains the power to modify it and reassign judicial work from time to time. The Handbook, however, does not articulate specific criteria or principles governing such allocation.
Appearance in official database
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of India periodically publishes subject-wise roster notifications indicating the allocation of fresh matters to particular benches in accordance with the Chief Justice’s administrative powers as MoR. These notifications are formally issued under the authority of the Chief Justice of India and circulated through the Court’s Registry.
For instance, a notification titled “Roster of the Work for Fresh Cases as per New Case Categories”, issued under the order of the Chief Justice of India and effective from 5 January 2026, provides an individual subject-category allocation framework. The document lists subject codes alongside corresponding areas of law and assigns them to designated benches. By way of illustration, the notification specifies: Subject Category Codes 201–202: Appointment of Constitutional Functionaries; Allocated to: Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. Such subject-wise rosters determine that all newly filed matters falling within the specified categories are automatically listed before the bench presided over by the Chief Justice. This demonstrates how the Master of the Roster’s authority is operationalised in practice: through formal administrative orders that structure bench composition and case flow based on subject matter.
These roster notifications are typically made available on the Supreme Court’s official website under the “Judges Roster” or “Notifications” sections as downloadable PDF circulars issued by the Registry; and reflected subsequently in daily cause lists and case-status entries.
High Courts
High Courts across India publish cause lists and bench allocations via the national eCourts Services portal. While there is no single consolidated roster portal for all High Courts, the eCourts platform allows users to select a High Court and specific bench to view cause lists and case status, search by party name, case number, advocate, FIR number, or filing year to see assigned benches and hearing dates. This means that bench assignments and scheduled hearings (which are ultimately determined through roster decisions) can be viewed indirectly through the official High Court cause lists and case status pages provided by the portal.
International experiences with Master of Roster
Comparative constitutional practice shows that while many jurisdictions vest administrative authority in the head of the judiciary, several have experimented with institutional or mechanisms based on rules to moderate or replace unilateral control over bench formation and case allocation.
United States
The Chief Justice of the United States occupies a position traditionally described as primus inter pares (“first among equals”). The U.S. Constitution does not expressly confer special administrative powers upon the office, however, the Chief Justice exercises significant influence through institutional roles such as presiding over the Judicial Conference of the United States, participating in appointments to specialised federal courts, and designating judges to bodies such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. In practice, these functions confer substantial discretionary authority.
At the level of the United States Courts of Appeals, matters are ordinarily heard by three-judge panels. Panel composition is not governed by a uniform statutory scheme. Instead, assignment practices vary by circuit and are shaped by considerations such as judicial availability, workload balancing, logistical convenience, and administrative efficiency. In some circuits, panel formation is overseen by the Chief Judge, while in others it is handled by the clerk’s office or court administrators. Empirical scholarship suggests that although panel formation is not strictly random, allocations are typically structured to enhance efficiency rather than ideological outcomes. The decentralised and administrative character of this process is intended to reduce perceptions of personalised control over bench composition.
Australia
The Federal Court of Australia employs a structured administrative model under the National Court Framework, which reorganised case management and allocation. Work is distributed through an individual docket system, with assignments made primarily by the court registry on the basis of workload, subject-matter expertise, and efficiency considerations. Australian courts generally treat judges as institutional generalists capable of hearing a wide range of matters. Allocation principles therefore emphasise neutrality and administrative criteria rather than personal discretion. The framework seeks to ensure that the identity of the judge does not materially influence the perceived fairness of adjudication, thereby reinforcing institutional impartiality.
Germany
Germany provides one of the most formalised safeguards against discretionary case allocation. Article 101 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany enshrines the principle of the “lawful judge” (gesetzlicher Richter), which prohibits removing a person from the jurisdiction of the judge predetermined by law. This requires that the competent judge or chamber be fixed in advance according to objective criteria. Statutory implementation is found in the Courts Constitution Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), which mandates the preparation of an annual allocation plan (Geschäftsverteilungsplan or “table of duties”). Case distribution is overseen by a Presidium, composed of the court president and elected judicial members. Judges not serving on the Presidium may comment on allocation proposals. The collective and pre-announced nature of this mechanism seeks to minimise both executive interference and internal arbitrariness.
Pakistan
In 2023, the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023, which effectively abolished the convention of the Chief Justice acting as the MoR. The Act establishes a committee comprising the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the two next most senior judges to constitute benches and allocate cases. Matters invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction are similarly screened and assigned by this committee. The Court observed that the term “master of roster” finds no textual basis in the Constitution and cautioned against concentration of administrative authority in a single individual. The reform was presented as enhancing transparency, collegiality, and due process through collective decision making.
However, in 2026, a larger bench of the Islamabad High Court ruled that the chief justice is the sole “master of the roster.”
Nepal
The Supreme Court of Nepal has adopted a mechanism based on lottery for assigning cases to benches, replacing the earlier practice in which the Chief Justice directly allocated matters. The system was introduced through a full-court decision amid concerns about transparency and alleged misuse of roster powers. Under the revised procedure, benches are constituted by drawing lots, with the long-term objective of transitioning to an automated digital allocation system. While critics have noted potential drawbacks such as inefficiency or lack of subject-matter matching, the lottery model has been viewed as an interim measure to reduce discretionary influence and enhance perceptions of neutrality.
Research that engages with MoR
In "Court on Trial: A Data-Driven Account of the Supreme Court of India" by Aparna Chandra, Sital Kalantry, and William Hubbard, it is discussed how even though Supreme Court has recognised that the Chief Justice of India’s administrative powers over bench constitution and case allocation as plenary, concentrated control over roster decisions, exercised without judicial checks, is consistent with constitutional principles of transparency and non-arbitrariness. Drawing on constitutional values articulated in cases such as Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, it is argued that broad discretionary authority may create risks of perceived arbitrariness in the assignment of cases.
Their analyses of judicial behaviour further emphasise that adjudication involves interpretive discretion shaped by judges’ professional backgrounds, experiences, and institutional positions. Although most matters are allocated routinely through subject-wise rosters, the Chief Justice may depart from routine allocation in constitutionally salient or politically sensitive cases by constituting specific or larger benches, including Constitution Benches, to resolve conflicts in precedent or address substantial constitutional questions. In these instances, bench composition may influence how legal issues are framed and resolved, rendering the roster power consequential not only administratively but also substantively.
Prakhar Raghuvanshi and Sarthak Bhardwaj in their articled titled "Reforming the Roster: Looking Beyond the Borders" have identified several institutional concerns associated with roster practices. These include observations of doctrinal inconsistency across differently constituted benches, the formation of what has been described as a “polyvocal” court characterised by competing lines of precedent, the repeated constitution of similar judges on major constitutional benches, concerns about gender and representational diversity in bench composition, and a perceived decline in dissenting opinions. Such critiques situate roster allocation within wider discussions about judicial independence, accountability, and the legitimacy of decision-making at the apex court.
MoR has alsp been analysed through the lens of the Basic Structure doctrine. In "The Standards Of Basic Structure: Questioning The Master Of The Roster", Ashit Srivastava and Shaileshwar Yadav examine whether exclusive control over case allocation is an indispensable institutional feature or whether alternative mechanisms could achieve similar administrative objectives with greater accountability. Two standards are commonly discussed: an “essentiality” or “no alternative” test, which asks whether the practice is necessary for the functioning of the Court, and an “efficiency” test, which evaluates whether the arrangement promotes effective and impartial judicial administration. The Supreme Court has treated MoR as an accepted constitutional convention, later formalised through the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, and scholars trace its historical origins to administrative powers exercised by Chief Justices of the colonial High Courts established under the Indian High Courts Act, 1861. At the same time, proposals for collegial or committee-based allocation systems, as well as greater procedural transparency, have been suggested as possible alternatives.
Kritika Ashok through her piece titled "Yes, Master of Roster" have also examined the practical consequences of roster practices, noting patterns such as the repeated constitution of similar benches for major constitutional matters, the exclusion of certain senior judges from Constitution Benches, and comparatively low rates of dissenting opinions during particular periods. Some researchers argue that these trends may influence doctrinal development, internal deliberation, and perceptions of independence. Legal scholarship has characterised the Chief Justice’s role in roster allocation as institutionally “dominant”, raising questions about how administrative control interacts with collegial decision-making and the tradition of dissent recognised under Article 145(5) of the Constitution.
Challenges
A central difficulty in supporting MoR is the limited availability of reliable data on how cases are assigned to benches. Although daily cause lists disclose bench compositions, they do not specify the criteria or methodology used in allocation. Roster decisions are treated as internal administrative matters of the Chief Justice, and written reasons or records are generally not published. This lack of transparency restricts independent scrutiny and makes systematic empirical analysis difficult.
Case allocation in the Supreme Court of India is largely governed by convention and administrative practice rather than detailed, codified rules. While subject-wise rosters exist, no uniform standards or objective criteria regulate departures from routine allocation, particularly in constitutionally significant or politically sensitive matters. The absence of standardised procedures has been associated with variability across different tenures of Chief Justices and limits comparability over time.
Proposals for reform such as randomised listing, automated allocation, or committee-based systems face practical and institutional constraints. These include the centralisation of administrative authority in the office of the Chief Justice, technological limitations in case-management systems, and concerns that purely mechanical allocation may undermine subject-matter expertise or efficiency. Informal norms of judicial hierarchy and the non-justiciable character of roster decisions further reduce avenues for oversight.
Way ahead
Publication of subject-wise and judge-wise allocation data on the Supreme Court’s official website, maintenance of standardised and machine-readable records of bench composition, and periodic disclosure of deviations from notified rosters are intended to enable systematic empirical analysis of bench formation and to enhance institutional accountability.
Unilateral control over case allocation should be replaced or moderated. While some commentators have advocated alternatives such as lottery-based systems, collegial or committee-based allocation, or automated listing mechanisms, others argue that neither randomisation nor a full collegium model adequately balances efficiency with coherence in judicial administration. On this view, the Court may retain MoR while developing an articulated and publicly stated rationale for bench composition, emphasising predictability and objective criteria while preserving limited administrative discretion with the Chief Justice. Practices such as the “seniority pools” approach adopted during the tenure of Chief Justice U.U. Lalit have been cited as possible starting points.
Further proposals call for a two-pronged reform of allocation processes: first, the adoption of objective, pre-declared principles or rules governing case assignment to reduce flexibility that may enable arbitrary or perception-based decision-making, and secondly, public disclosure of the method used for periodic preparation of rosters. It has also been suggested that there should be a mandatory requirement to record reasons for the constitution of new or special benches, thereby facilitating scrutiny and strengthening judicial accountability. Comparative institutional models have informed this proposal. In particular, the German system—based on pre-defined allocation norms, publication of “tables of duties,” and distribution of authority through an elected Presidium under the principle of the “lawful judge”—has been cited as a model capable of limiting manipulation while maintaining efficiency. It has been argued that similar safeguards could be incorporated in India through rule-making powers under Article 145(1) of the Constitution or through statutory reform.
Collectively, these measures seek to preserve administrative effectiveness while improving transparency, reducing perceptions of arbitrariness, and reinforcing public confidence in the neutrality of bench formation at the Supreme Court.