No confidence Motion
What is a No-Confidence Motion
A No-Confidence Motion is a parliamentary motion moved to test whether the Council of Ministers continues to enjoy the confidence of the directly elected House. At the Union level, it is moved in the Lok Sabha against the Council of Ministers. If the motion is adopted, the government is expected to resign. Motion of no-confidence (no-confidence motion) is a statement or vote that states that a person(s) in a position of responsibility (government, managerial, etc.) is no longer deemed fit to hold that position, perhaps because they are inadequate in some respect, are failing to carry out obligations, or are making decisions that other members feel are detrimental.[1]Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "the formal legal method by which a legislative body, by a majority vote, forces the resignation of a cabinet or ministry."[2] Merriam-Webster defines a" no-confidence motion as a formal vote by which the members of a legislature or similar deliberative body vote to indicate that they no longer support a leader, government, etc."[3] While Collins Dictionary defines it as " if members of an organisation pass a vote or motion of no-confidence in someone, they take a vote which shows that they no longer support that person or their ideas."[4]
Official definition of a No-Confidence Motion
Constitutional Aspect
A No-Confidence Motion is a parliamentary tool used to test whether the ruling government still commands a majority in the legislature. There is no explicit provision for the term in the Constitution. The constitutional foundation for a no-confidence motion is derived from Article 75(3), which establishes the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers to the Lok Sabha, and Article 164(2), which establishes the responsibility of ministers to the legislative assembly at the state level.[5]
Lok Sabha Rules
The detailed procedure for the motion is set out in Rule 198 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha. It is the procedural basis of the motion of no confidence . A No- confidence motion can only be passed in the Lok Sabha.
Procedure of No-Confidence Motion
198. Procedure regarding motion of no-confidence in the Council of Ministers:
I. Making the Motion
A motion expressing want of confidence in the Council of Ministers may be moved subject to the following conditions:
The member, when called upon by the Speaker, shall ask for leave to make the motion. Before doing so, the member must submit a written notice of the proposed motion to the Secretary-General by 10:00 hours on that day.
Proviso: Any notice received after 10:00 hours shall be deemed to have been received at 10:00 hours on the next day on which the House sits.
II. Grant of Leave by the Speaker
If the Speaker is satisfied that the motion is in order, the Speaker shall read the motion aloud to the House and request those members who are in favour of granting leave to rise in their places.
- If 50 or more members rise, the Speaker shall declare that leave is granted and shall fix a day for taking up the motion, which shall not be more than ten days from the date on which leave is asked for.
- If fewer than 50 members rise, the Speaker shall inform the member that the House has not granted leave and the motion shall not proceed.
III. Allotment of Time for Discussion
Where leave has been granted under Section II above, the Speaker may, after taking into account the state of business before the House, allot a day, days, or part of a day for the discussion of the motion.
IV. Putting the Question to a Vote
At the appointed hour on the allotted day or on the last of the allotted days, as the case may be the Speaker shall forthwith put every question necessary to determine the decision of the House on the motion, without further debate or delay.
V. Time Limit on Speeches
The Speaker may, if deemed fit, prescribe a time limit for speeches made during the discussion of the motion.
History of Vote of No Confidence in India
The First no-confidence motion was moved during the third Lok Sabha in 1963 when Jawaharlal Nehru was the Prime Minister. The motion was moved by former Congress and Praja Socialist Party leader Acharya J B Kripalani. The motion, moved by 40 MPs, was debated for 21 hours and lasted four days. Nehru successfully managed to defeat the motion.
The next no-confidence motion was moved roughly a year later in 1964 by N C Chatterjee, an Independent MP, against Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri. While moving his motion, he said, “There is a crisis in every sphere. Honestly, there is a crisis in social, political, economic and other spheres and for all this, I hold this government mainly responsible.” From 1964 -75, the Lok Sabha debated 15 no-confidence motions. Three were against Shastri and 12 against Indira Gandhi. Indira went on to face three more no-confidence motions between 1981 and 1982. However, none of these was successful in dislodging a government. Indira Gandhi faced the largest number of no-confidence motions in the history of independent India, with 15 motions during her 16-year tenure (1966-77 and then from 1980 to her assassination in October 1984) as prime minister.
The first no-confidence motion that led to the fall of a government was moved by Y B Chavan in 1979 against the government of Prime Minister Morarji Desai. After a nine-hour debate spread over two days, Desai resigned before the motion could be put to a vote.
Rajiv Gandhi faced one in 1987, which he defeated by a simple voice vote because of his overwhelming majority in the Lok Sabha. However, P V Narasimha Rao had two close calls during his term in the 10th Lok Sabha. The first motion against him was moved by Jaswant Singh, which he defeated with a margin of 46 votes. Rao did not face any trouble in defeating the second one, moved by Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The third no-confidence motion that Rao defeated with a margin of 14 votes was marred by controversy. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha MPs were taken to court for having accepted bribes to cast their vote to defeat the motion. Then, the Leader of the Opposition, Sonia Gandhi, moved a no-confidence motion against the Atal Bihari Vajpayee government. After an over 21-hour-long debate, the motion was defeated on August 19, 2003, with 314 MPs opposing the motion, while 189 supported it
In recent years, two no-confidence motions have been passed against the Modi government. The first no-confidence motion was moved by Srinivas Kesineni of the Telugu Desam Party. After around 11 hours of debate, the motion was put to a vote on July 20, 2018. It was supported by 135 MPs, while 330 opposed it. The motion was defeated [6]. The most recent no-confidence motion against Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government was introduced in the Lok Sabha on July 26, 2023, by Congress MP Gaurav Gogoi. It was primarily driven by the opposition to force PM Modi to address the ethnic violence in Manipur. The motion was resoundingly defeated by a voice vote on August 10, 2023, after a three-day debate
Vote of No Confidence vs. Vote of Confidence
A no-confidence motion is slightly different from a motion of confidence, or trust vote, which is moved by the government, as an ordinary motion under Rule 184. A government can prove its majority by moving a confidence motion as a counter to the opposition parties.
| Point of Difference | Vote of No Confidence | Vote of Confidence |
|---|---|---|
| Who Moves It | Moved by the Opposition | Moved by the Government itself |
| Rule | Rule 198 of Lok Sabha Rules | Rule 184 of Lok Sabha Rules |
| Purpose | To challenge and pull down the government | To prove that the government still has majority support |
| When Used | When the opposition believes the government has lost majority | When there is political uncertainty or a coalition crisis |
| Minimum Support Needed | At least 50 members must support it to be admitted | No such minimum requirement |
| Initiative | Initiated by the opposition | Initiated by the government on its own |
| Constitutional Basis | Article 75(3) collective responsibility of Council of Ministers | Article 75(3), on the same basis, but the government takes the first step |
| If It Passes | Government must resign | Government must resign |
| If It Fails | Government survives | Government survives |
| Historical Example | 1963 Acharya Kripalani moved against Nehru | Prime Minister V.P. Singh's government fell on November 7, 1990, after he lost a crucial vote of confidence in the Lok Sabha by a stunning margin of 346 to 142. |
| Nature | A challenge from outside the government | A self-declaration by the government |
| Also Known As | Motion of No Trust / No Trust Vote | Trust Vote / Confidence Motion / Floor Test |
As defined in Case Laws
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) [7]
The Supreme Court held in the case that the floor of the House is the only legitimate place to test whether a government commands majority support. A Governor cannot dismiss a state government based on his personal assessment that the Chief Minister has lost a majority; he must first allow the government to face a floor test. Invoking Article 356 without allowing a floor test is unconstitutional and mala fide. A Chief Minister's refusal to face the floor test can itself be treated as proof that he has lost the confidence of the legislature. The court clearly stated that no confidence must be proven in the House, not assumed outside it.
Shivraj Singh Chouhan v. Speaker, MP Legislative Assembly (2020) [8]
The Court ruled in the case that when the House is already in session, a no-confidence motion is the normal and proper remedy available to any party wishing to test whether the government commands majority support. The Governor should ordinarily not interfere with this process and must allow the no-confidence motion to run its due course. However, the Court also held that in exigent and compelling circumstances such as where political uncertainty is acute and the Chief Minister himself has expressed willingness for a floor test but then avoided it the Governor can bypass the no-confidence motion route and directly call for a trust vote (floor test), without waiting for a no-confidence motion to be moved and decided. A no-confidence motion is the preferred route when the House is in session, but it is not the exclusive remedy. The Governor retains the power to call a floor test when circumstances genuinely demand it.
No Confidence Motion: In other countries
Australia
The Australian Parliament's House of Representatives treats no-confidence and censure motions as among the most significant actions it can take, rooted in the fundamental Westminster principle that any government must at all times maintain the confidence of the lower house to remain in power. When a government loses that confidence, convention requires it to either resign and allow an alternative government to form, or advise the Governor-General to dissolve the House and call a fresh election. This makes these motions uniquely powerful compared to all other parliamentary business.
In terms of procedure, any motion that expresses censure of or no confidence in the government is given automatic priority over all other business, but only once a Minister formally accepts it as such under Standing Order 48. This acceptance is crucial because, without it the motion is treated like any ordinary private member's business and sits on the Notice Paper without special priority. Once accepted, however, it must be dealt with before anything else in the House, and extended speaking times apply, with the mover of the motion and the Prime Minister each getting thirty minutes to speak, while all other members receive twenty minutes, reflecting the seriousness with which Parliament treats such challenges.
A no-confidence motion directly challenges the government's fundamental right to remain in office, and if passed, the government must either resign immediately or advise the Governor-General to dissolve the House and call a general election. A censure motion, on the other hand, expresses strong disapproval or reprimand over a specific act, decision or policy of the government or an individual minister without necessarily demanding the government fall altogether. A successful censure could still lead to a government's retirement from office unless the responsible minister resigns or the offending policy is reversed to satisfy the House, making it a serious political weapon even if its constitutional consequences are less automatic than a no-confidence motion..
Despite all this, no government has ever actually been brought down by a successful direct vote of no-confidence or censure in the House of Representatives. The only partial exception was in November 1975 when a motion of no confidence in newly commissioned Prime Minister Fraser was passed following the dramatic dismissal of the Whitlam Government, but even this did not lead to a change of government in the conventional sense as both Houses were dissolved by the Governor-General before the sitting could resume.[9]
United States Of America
The United States does not have a "vote of no confidence" mechanism at the federal level to remove a President or trigger snap elections. A vote of no confidence has a technical meaning and concrete consequences only in a parliamentary form of government, in which the continuance of the executive in office is dependent on its maintaining majority support in the parliament (or one house thereof). The American system of separated powers, on the other hand, makes no provision for votes of no confidence in the parliamentary sense. Except through the process of impeachment, accordingly, no action by the Congress (or of either house) can have any practical effect similar to that of a parliamentary vote of no confidence. Under the U.S. system of government, with the constitutional scheme of separated powers, the legislature Congress does not directly impact the removal of officials in the executive branch of the federal government (other than through impeachments). Adoption of a resolution expressing a lack of confidence could have symbolic effects as an expression of the sense of Congress (or of either house). A vote expressing "no confidence" of the Senate or the House in a particular official of the government, while it may certainly have political implications, would have no specific legal import.[10] The closest functional equivalent to remove a president that the US system provides is impeachment, which is a two-stage legal process rather than a political vote of confidence.
The Motion to Vacate the Chair is the closest thing the United States House of Representatives has to a no-confidence motion, though it targets only the Speaker of the House rather than the executive government as a whole. The process of a vote to vacate the Speaker’s chair is a high-stakes legislative maneuver in the U.S. House of Representatives. This procedural tool allows members to initiate a resolution to remove the sitting Speaker, effectively serving as a vote of no confidence in the chamber’s presiding officer. The mechanism underscores the political volatility of the House, particularly during periods of narrow partisan control. The successful adoption of a motion to vacate immediately throws the legislative body into a period of uncertainty and necessitates the urgent election of a new leader.[11]
Germany
Under Article 67, the Chancellor may be voted out of office by the German Bundestag only if it elects a new Chancellor; this process is known as the constructive vote of no confidence. The safeguards written into the Basic Law to favour a strong parliament and stable majorities are the result of historical experience gained in both the Empire and the Weimar Republic. The German Bundestag has never been plagued by chronically fragile coalitions and powerless chancellors. Its power to scrutinise the government and to co-govern reflects a historically conditioned shift in the distribution of roles between the government, Parliament and the head of state.[12]
The actual procedure under Article 67, the motion must be initiated by the Bundestag itself rather than by the Chancellor, and crucially the Bundestag can only pass a vote of no confidence in the Federal Chancellor if a new Federal Chancellor is simultaneously elected by an absolute majority of all Bundestag members, not merely a majority of those present and voting. This requirement for an absolute majority, also called the "Chancellor's majority," means that abstentions effectively count against the motion, making it considerably harder to pass than a simple majority vote. Once the motion passes, the Federal President is constitutionally required to dismiss the sitting Chancellor and appoint the newly elected successor, ensuring there is never a period without a functioning head of government. So far in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, there has only been one Chancellor who took office after a constructive vote of no confidence, namely Helmut Kohl. He succeeded Helmut Schmidt in 1982.[13]
Research that engages with
The Concept OF “NO - CONFIDENCE MOTION” in India with reference to the political instance of the Parliament Monsoon Session 2018[1]
Kanisha Pathak writes her article with a clear dual purpose: first explaining the procedural and constitutional mechanics of the no-confidence motion to a general reader, and then using the 2018 Monsoon Session as a live case study to show how this tool plays out in real political life. Her approach combines constitutional analysis with political commentary, drawing from Rules 184, 191 and 198 of Lok Sabha procedure, Article 75 of the Constitution, and direct observations of the 2018 parliamentary session.
Pathak builds her analysis historically by tracing all twenty-seven no-confidence motions from Acharya Kripalani's first motion against Nehru in 1963 right through to the 2018 motion against Modi, carefully noting who moved each motion, which Prime Ministers faced the most challenges and which ones survived. By laying out this historical record she establishes that no-confidence motions in India have almost always been defeated, with Morarji Desai's resignation in 1979 standing as the only genuine exception, a pattern that raises questions about what these exercises actually achieve in practice.
Her most pointed observations come when she turns to the 2018 motion brought by the Telugu Desam Party over Andhra Pradesh's demand for special status. Through her analysis of the political context she argues convincingly that the motion was never about actually removing the government but was instead a strategic move by the opposition to project unity ahead of the 2019 elections, with the outcome never in any real doubt given BJP's comfortable majority of 273 seats in a house of 535.
She concludes by reflecting on the broader purpose of such motions, arguing that Parliament's true value lies in dialogue and accountability, and expressing hope that no-confidence motions will one day serve their genuine democratic purpose rather than being reduced to political theatre, as she felt was demonstrated by certain theatrical gestures during the 2018 debate.
The Debate on the Constructive Vote of No Confidence in India – Trading in Accountability for Stability?[14]
Malte Pehl begins the article by conducting a rigorous comparative political study examining whether India should adopt the German model of a constructive vote of no confidence, a reform that has been debated in India repeatedly over twenty-five years. His research method is notably cross-national, drawing on constitutional texts, parliamentary records, comparative political science literature and empirical data from both India and Germany to test whether this proposed reform would actually deliver the stability its advocates promise.
Pehl's central research approach involves systematically examining every instance where confidence and no-confidence votes were used in India from 1989 onwards, building a detailed table of motions across Lok Sabhas and comparing those outcomes with equivalent data from Germany. What he finds challenges the conventional wisdom, namely that Germany's constructive model has actually produced more early government terminations through confidence-related votes than India has seen since Independence, effectively undermining the core argument that adopting the German model would bring greater stability to Indian politics. Pehl closes by acknowledging that the political turbulence of the 1990s was actually a sign of India's democracy becoming more open and representative after decades of dominance by a single party. He notes that since 1999 Indian governments have been much more stable on their own, suggesting that politicians have simply learned better how to manage coalitions. Rather than importing a foreign constitutional tool that could damage accountability, he argues India should focus on cleaner political parties, less corruption, and a clearer process for officially confirming a new Prime Minister in office.
A Study Of No- Confidence Motions In The Indian Parliament (1952-70)[15]
Mahander Kumar Saini, undertakes a systematic study of all ten no-confidence motions moved in India's first four Parliaments between 1952 and 1970, drawing directly from Lok Sabha Debate records, parliamentary proceedings and primary political sources to build his analysis. Rather than simply describing the motions, he uses them as a lens to examine a deeper question about whether the opposition in a one-party dominant system can meaningfully use this tool at all, and his answer, backed by detailed evidence from each debate, is essentially no.
His method involves going through each motion era by era, prime minister by prime minister, carefully recording what issues were raised, which parties supported or opposed each other, how the votes fell, and crucially, how the nature of the debates themselves changed over time. By doing this systematically across Nehru, Shastri and Indira Gandhi's governments, he is able to identify a consistent pattern where opposition parties routinely contradicted each other during the very debates meant to bring down the government, with left-wing parties defending what right-wing parties attacked and vice versa, effectively handing Congress an easy defence every single time. What makes Saini's research particularly interesting is his finding that none of the ten motions were ever genuinely expected to succeed, a fact even the movers themselves quietly acknowledged. Through close reading of the debate transcripts, he shows that these exercises functioned less as real threats to government and more as political theatre, serving at best as pressure tools that occasionally nudged the government into minor cabinet reshuffles or policy retreats, such as Nehru's reorganisation of his cabinet following the Kamraj Plan in 1963. Saini concludes from his research that in a parliamentary system where one party commands an unbreakable majority and the opposition is too fragmented to offer any credible alternative government, the no-confidence motion loses its essential purpose. His study ultimately argues that this powerful democratic tool, designed to hold governments accountable, had been reduced in the Indian context of that era to little more than a recurring ritual, and suggests that other parliamentary devices like censure motions might have served the opposition's real goals far more effectively.
Challenges
Vote of no-confidence can also be misused for political purposes, disrupting governance and stability. Furthermore, the process can be time-consuming and might divert attention from other critical legislative matters. Striking a balance between ensuring accountability and avoiding political gamesmanship remains a challenge.[16]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Pathak, Kanisha. "The Concept of 'No-Confidence Motion' in India with Reference to the Political Instance of the Parliament Monsoon Session 2018." GNLU Centre for Constitutional and Administrative Law, Gujarat National Law University, 2018.
- ↑ https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I025d92d6808511e4b391a0bc737b01f9/View/FullText.html?navigationPath=Search%2Fv1%2Fresults%2Fnavigation%2Fi0a89d8ad0000019ef42a5f60cc6a3a67%3F
- ↑ https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/vote%20of%20no%20confidence
- ↑ https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/no-confidence
- ↑ https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/the-story-of-no-confidence
- ↑ https://prsindia.org/articles-by-prs-team/the-story-of-no-confidence
- ↑ 1994 AIR 1918
- ↑ AIRONLINE 2020 SC 439
- ↑ https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/Powers_practice_and_procedure/Practice7/HTML/Chapter9/Motions_of_no_confidence_and_censure
- ↑ https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RL/PDF/RL34037/RL34037.7.pdf
- ↑ https://legalclarity.org/vote-to-vacate-the-speaker-house-rules-and-procedures/
- ↑ https://www.bundestag.de/en/parliament/history/parliamentarism/frg_parliamentarism/frg_parliamentarism-200324
- ↑ https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/service/archiv-bundesregierung/what-is-the-vote-of-confidence-2322238
- ↑ Pehl, Malte. “The Debate on the Constructive Vote of No Confidence in India – Trading in Accountability for Stability?” Verfassung Und Recht in Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America 49, no. 1 (2016): 16–33. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26160090.
- ↑ Saini, Mahander Kumar, and Mahindar Kumar Saini. “A STUDY OF NO-CONFIDENCE MOTIONS IN THE INDIAN PARLIAMENT (1952-70).” The Indian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 3 (1971): 297–318. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41854451.
- ↑ https://lawcolloquy.com/publications/blog/no-confidence-motion-in-india-explained/253